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 1 
Introduction  
 
Michael A. Wilkinson 
and 
Michael W. Dowdle 
 
 
 
Martin Loughlin’s Foundations of Public Law represents a challenge as well as an 
opportunity for the discipline of public law.
1
 It offers a radical and unique reworking 
of public law scholarship, converting it into a wide-ranging, interdisciplinary study of 
the political character of the state.  This is challenging in its rejection of the idea that 
public law can meaningfully be captured through juridical doctrine alone, or by a 
method of positivist jurisprudence more generally.  Instead, it requires an approach 
that is capable of incorporating political theory, political sociology and state theory. 
Public law is recast by Foundations as integral to these disciplines. By the same 
token, it provides a vital opportunity to free public law from its jurisprudential 
straitjacket. By bringing public law into conceptual and discursive interplay with 
other disciplines, Foundations offers to transform the discipline of public law into a 
vehicle for exploring the core elements and evolutionary character of the modern 
state.  
 
Such a reworking demands critical interrogation.  Can public law maintain its internal 
coherence if extended in this way? Does Foundations offer the normative resources to 
renew the discipline in the context of the many serious challenges it faces? Is 
Foundations’ methodology a suitable one for understanding the concrete phenomena 
associated with public law, and in specific jurisdictional settings? The purpose of the 
articles presented here is to consider these questions, and to advance our 
understanding of the challenges and opportunities provided by Foundations for the 
development of the modern discipline of public law.  
 
 
The Foundations of Foundations 
 
Foundations offers a reconstruction of public law at once traditional and radical. It 
presents public law not simply as a discrete set of juridical doctrines and practices but 
as integral to our capacity to make political sense of the world. Public law is 
approached not as part of an autonomous legal system, or as a doctrinal offshoot of 
private law or common law, but as an essential feature of the modern political 
imaginary. Public law, in this account, is not derivative but foundational to the 
construction and maintenance of the modern idea of the state and its exercise of 
political authority.  
 
If it is commonplace that in modernity this idea of the state and its authoritative 
apparatus of rule anchors our political being, Foundations argues this to be a 
thoroughly juridical phenomenon, but one that can not be grasped by focusing on the 
judicial branch of government or the positive law alone. It can only be grasped 
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through an analysis of the key conceptual building blocks of state authority, along 
with an historical contextualization of their evolution over time.  
 
This contextualization suggests that, although central to ‘seeing and thinking like a 
state’, to constructing a scheme of political intelligibility, public law is in danger of 
being eclipsed, subverted or transformed in contemporary conditions - due in part to 
material changes in the nature and techniques of governing and in part to the 
pressures on the nation-state as the hegemonic locus of political power and authority.
2
 
But the danger also flows from the increasingly specialized and technical nature of the 
discipline of public law, a retreat encapsulated in the turn to systematizations of 
positive public law, which has its analogues in general jurisprudence (in the traditions 
of Kelsen and Hart).  
 
Foundations of Public Law attempts to redefine the discipline of public law, away 
from a court-centric doctrinal jurisprudence concerned primarily with judicial review 
– whether in positivist or moralist guise – and towards a ‘political jurisprudence’ 
based on the idea of political right. It a a project that aims at retrieval of neglected 
ideas and at re-foundation of the discourse of public law as much as a historical 
reconstruction of its origins and development. 
 
In performing this radical reorientation of the enterprise of public law – radical only 
in the proper sense of uncovering and reclaiming its roots - Foundations draws on 
diverse but also traditional sets of materials, integrating legal scholarship as well as 
writings in political theory, social theory, moral theory, state theory (Staatslehre), and 
political science. Foundations analyses this in a historical rather than abstract 
orientation, integrating legal material from the UK, continental Europe, and the 
United States, much of which has evolved independently.  
 
The manner of this synchronic retrieval adds a further disciplinary layer to the 
analysis as well as providing an evolutionary narrative, tracking the constitutional 
development of the modern state and the pressures it faces in the latter half of the 
twentieth century. In this process, Foundations develops a unique theoretical frame, 
incorporating work in the cannon of political and legal philosophy - Hobbes and 
Rousseau, Kant and Hegel, Schmitt and Foucault, amongst many others, - which has 
sought to uncover ‘the laws of the political’, or the basic rules and precepts of 
political association. Throughout Foundations, these giants of political philosophy are 
rendered central figures in the tradition of political jurisprudence and of a 
reconstructed public law. 
 
For these reasons, Foundations stands as deserving of special attention, not only from 
public law scholars, but also from political theorists, constitutional theorists, 
constitutional historians and all those interested in the fate of the modern state and the 
chances of its survival, renewal or transcendence in the 21
st
 century. Even those who 
contest the particular claims made in Foundations, or reject its overall endeavor will 
not doubt that it contributes centrally to this project, if only, as one major critique 
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notes, because it now provides the starting point for any deeper inquiry into the 
subject of public law.
 3
  
 
The purpose of this collection of essays is to begin precisely such an inquiry. And it 
aims to do so in a thoroughly critical manner, taking neither the methodology nor the 
content of Foundations’ theoretical reconstruction for granted. To pursue this aim, we 
have integrated critical commentary by scholars from diverse traditions and 
disciplines who contest the claims - both general and particular - made in and by 
Foundations. 
 
In the remainder of this introduction we first single out two features in Foundations 
that stand out for special attention: the integration of law and politics into a coherent 
conceptual scheme, and the historical integration of public law with the state’s 
evolving political form. We then turn to consider, categorise and summarise the 
series of trenchant critiques made of Foundations in the articles that follow, in order 
to begin to reflect on where this criticism leaves the development of the discipline. 
Serious doubts remain about the viability of the project of Foundations as a whole as 
well as about its discrete claims; the doubts raised are conceptual and synthetic, 
methodological as well as particular. These doubts - and the critiques that generate 
them - will be categorized here under four headings: normative, materialist, 
methodological, and comparative, in an attempt to organize the set of critical 
reflections, and provide some coherence to the various complaints. 
 
 
Law and Politics 
 
Constitutional theory and public law scholarship commonly approach politics as 
outside the law, to be tamed or contained by law, or even as antithetical to law. 
Politics is presumed to follow a distinct logic of power as opposed to authority, or to 
inhabit the realm of fact as opposed to norm.  Alternatively, politics is ignored, 
occluded by a formalist or positivistic approach to the constitution of the polity. In 
normativist traditions, particularly in a liberal constitutional imagination, public law 
exists to protect the individual from interference by the political organs of the state; 
constitutional scholarship then consists in identifying, specifying or offering 
suggestions for improving structures to constrain and limit the powers of the state, 
explicating their interrelationship and their overall architecture with particular 
attention to the judicial branch of government.  
 
Foundations suggests this ubiquitous vision to be misleading. Public law, understood 
in the broader sense of political right, does not simply constrain the organs of the 
state; it also creates, shapes and maintains them. It does so by establishing and 
sustaining the governing relationship between rulers and ruled. And since this 
governing relationship is not exhausted by the positive law narrowly conceived, 
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public law as political jurisprudence captures all juridical aspects of its 
institutionalization and regulation, and also, significantly those occasions of 
abrogation or suspension of ordinary institutional forms in response to crisis or 
emergency.  
 
Public law as seen through the lens of political jurisprudence thus consists in the 
fundamental laws and practices that structure the governing relationship as well as 
those prudential judgments required to maintain – or regain - stability in that 
relationship. The set of practices and the manner of their ordering is captured in the 
term droit politique or ‘political right’.  
 
This might be usefully contrasted with what in the English-speaking world has 
emerged in the field often referred to as ‘general jurisprudence’. If the thrust of 
general jurisprudence (in the tradition of Kelsen and Hart) is to provide an account of 
the systemic coherence of positive law as such, the purpose of Foundations is to 
provide an account of the socio-epistemic coherence of the laws of politics, of what 
gives claims to political authority traction and of what undermines them in the world 
of lived experience.   
 
To capture the phenomenon of public law therefore demands an analysis that 
transcends the positive law alone; it demands, in the vernacular of Foundations, a 
‘political jurisprudence’. This is reconstructed by Loughlin through an analysis of the 
key building blocks of ‘state’, ‘constitution’ and ‘government’, as they emerge and 
evolve in concrete public law traditions (especially but not limited to the German 
tradition of Staatslehre) and in tandem with classical works of political theory, from 
Hobbes through to Foucault, which seek to reveal the grounds of the authority of the 
modern state and explore its practices of governing.  
 
It is from the practice and discourse of political right as a state- and polity-building 
exercise that the distinctive jurisprudence of public law is reconstructed.  The task of 
this political jurisprudence is to make theoretical and practical sense out of the various 
relations and configurations of power and authority that emerge in practice, enabling 
their recognition as a set of relatively coherent phenomena. But because of the 
inherently conflictual nature of the human condition - conflict over material as well as 
symbolic resources – the ways in which relative coherence and stability are achieved 
will perpetually evolve.  
 
For the governing process to convert conflict into relatively manageable contest, an 
overall unity of purpose and character needs to be established and maintained through 
representational devices. And, in Loughlin’s analysis, the dominant mode this takes in 
the context of modern public law is the unity of the State and autonomy of the 
political on which its power and authority rests. The arrangements of public law thus 
contribute to the maintenance of the state as a political unity, one that discharges 
political responsibility to its subjects.  
 
This political unity can never be fully captured by rule-based categories, not least 
because conflict can never be fully or finally resolved. If ‘the establishment of an 
autonomous domain of the political is therefore a historical achievement’,4 it is also a 
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precarious one, particularly as through late modernity the legal-political coupling is 
put under increasing pressure from social, economic and geo-political developments.  
 
The significance of this reconstruction – as well as the pressure it is put under - can be 
appreciated by considering that outside the Anglosphere, in both continental Europe 
and in Asia, the formational appeal of public law continues to exist precisely in its 
state-creating and state-shaping functions. The same can be said of the public law of 
the European Union, where the polity-building function of the law, as well as its 
limits in performing this function, continues to offer an experimental case in re-
configuring relations of political power and authority that affect the constitution of the 
European state and state system. Foundations thus facilitates the cross-fertilization of 
public law scholarship, representing the most promising framework to date for 
integrating diverse experiences of public law into a common discourse, rooted in a 
particular context of modern state development that is extending at the same time as it 
is coming under increasing pressure.  
 
 
The Evolution of the Modern State 
 
To expand on this last claim, we can consider briefly a crude version of the exercise 
in historical reconstruction that Foundations itself relies on. There are two key 
foundational shifts that occur with the emergence of the modern state. The first is a 
change in the belief system on which political authority rests: political jurisprudence 
thus captures the process of secularization of authority, corresponding to Weber’s 
well known account of the process of modern ‘disenchantment’, involving a loss of 
faith in divine or substantive natural law. In a constitutional vernacular associated 
with the period of modern revolution, but which becomes widespread over time, ‘We, 
the people’ are the new foundation of political authority.  
 
Foundations’ contribution here is to offer an alternative to the Weberian narrative 
which equates this process of secularization with total positivisation of rules and 
norms, which reduces power to sheer coercive force, and which effects a complete 
separation of fact and value. The normative power of the factual – including the 
symbolic imaginary – remains in the secular age; disenchantment is far from total. 
This is nowhere more apparent than in the realm of public law, despite the pressures 
of modernization. And the point of Loughlin’s political jurisprudence is to capture in 
a scientific manner the ways in which the normative power of the factual is retained 
but also transformed in comparison to the medieval mindset and the pre-modern 
understanding of the governing relationship.  
 
The second foundational shift that characterises the modern state is more material in 
nature: the evolution in the power and authority structures necessary to produce and 
sustain a political community in the face of competing political and economic 
pressures. To respond comprehensively to military and other kinds of security threat 
and provide for the well-being of the people in conditions of economic scarcity 
requires the actual exercise of particular forms of governing power. This real power to 
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dominate can be captured by the term, used initially by Spinoza, potentia, in contrast 
to a claim to command and rightfully assert political rule captured by potestas.
5
  
 
The state cannot govern by potestas alone; the legitimacy of its governing power must 
be based on more than a claim to a formal right to rule, even as its authority becomes 
increasingly rationalized on the basis of legal rules and formal practices. The state 
must generate allegiance through its actual delivery of certain public goods - not least 
in order for its claim to rightful rule to be credible and match a corresponding set of 
beliefs on the part of the ruled in its continuing legitimacy.  
 
To put the point differently, authority requires both a claim to rightful rule and the 
compulsion or compliance that corresponds with actual obedience; de jure and de 
facto authority. But for the purpose of understanding public law in terms of political 
jurisprudence it makes little sense to make a formal separation of these elements. 
Authority is thus not a purely normative concept; it is irreducible either to moral 
principle or positive legalisation. Neither, however, is it a purely materialist concept 
that can be reduced to sheer coercion or violence or any other causal forces of nature. 
It must be based in political right and be able to produce political goods.  
 
Since the modern state, in Foundations’ reconstruction, is a creature of potentia as 
well as potestas, it is also an evolving beast. As political power evolves to 
accommodate human needs and social demands, so too does political authority. 
Potestas and potentia are interdependent and dialectical rather than alternatives; 
political authority ‘is a product of their relationship.’ And this will change over time 
with the evolution of the constitutional imagination and changing constitutional 
circumstances. 
 
Foundations’ contribution here is to chart the nature and evolution of constitutional 
discourse of public law. Significantly, it insists that there will and can be no 
consensus on the nature of political goods or on the correct manner of their 
production over time. As such, ‘the law of the political cannot be an ethic of ultimate 
ends.’ Political conduct ‘involves a trade-off between rival and often 
incommensurable goods in circumstances where there is no authoritative principle or 
standard for resolving any dispute’.6 Prudential judgment is therefore required; 
governing is an activity without end.  
 
Throughout the twentieth century, this governing activity and the dialectical process 
on which it is based become increasingly fraught. More and more is required of the 
traditional state in terms of both its normative as well as its factual basis of 
legitimacy, just as its overall authority is increasingly called into question by 
processes of European integration and economic globalisation. So although the 
normative standards of rightful rule become increasingly demanding, as the governing 
arrangements of the state are increasingly called on to satisfy principles of democratic 
process and the rule of law, so too do the expectations of its capacity to protect and 
enhance the welfare of its citizens in increasingly pressing conditions. This has led to 
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the emergence of new forms of rules and regulations, as well as increasingly 
prescriptive legal and informal goal-setting.   
 
If the apparatus of rule of the modern state, both repressive and ideological, is 
classically grounded in traditional legal categories - constitutional law, administrative 
law, competition law, and various aspects of private law - much of its standards are 
increasingly prescribed by soft or informal law. The disciplinary and regulatory 
character of its governing arrangements increasingly derives from routinization, 
expectation and informal coercion rather than from threat of official state sanction.  
 
As normative standards and practical expectations come into conflict with one 
another, particularly in times that are considered critical for the polity’s identity or 
even survival, practices and methods of sustaining the governing relationship thus 
change and even transform the nature of the relationship and the practices and 
methods that undergird it. The challenge then is to grasp the juristic significance of 
these phenomena. This challenge is significantly aided by the conceptual tools offered 
in Foundations, in particular the dynamic of potestas and potentia as this evolves 
through the practice and discourse of political right. But it also leaves open the 
question of whether the phenomenon of public law as it develops into the 21
st
 century 
has reached the stage where a new set of conceptual tools are required for its proper 
scrutiny and full understanding.   
 
 
Continuity and critique 
 
In synthesizing diverse and sometimes competing intellectual traditions into a 
coherent whole that tracks the dynamics of state development, Foundations 
contributes to the very discourse of public law it identifies, precipitating further 
syntheses with new ideas and related phenomena. 
 
But the project, in its rather terse concluding sections, also calls into question the 
stability and durability of public law in contemporary social and political conditions, 
in particular the increasing demands placed on its governing apparatus by the ‘rise of 
the social’. This suggests that the enterprise of political jurisprudence is itself ripe for 
renewal. Critique is therefore necessary for continuity of the discipline, whether 
through refinement or abandonment of the project of ‘political jurisprudence’.  
 
Critique will be categorised here along normative, material, methodological, and 
comparative lines. This division does do not of course reflect any tight or neat 
separation, it merely serves a heuristic purpose and connects general themes. It 
exposes the extraordinary breadth and depth of curiosity that Foundations has aroused 
across a great range of disciplinary foci and helps the reader to determine for 
themselves where the study of public law will or should be taken in the future.  
 
 
The Normative Critique 
 
The first critique casts doubt on whether Foundations does justice to the full 
normative force of the idea and practice of public law. In particular, it suggests that 
the occlusion of the ethical dimension of the state as subjective freedom leaves 
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Foundations without the tools to address contemporary anti-statism , particularly as it 
emerges in advanced liberal or neo-liberal discourse. In privileging a top-down 
dialectic of potestas and potentia based on sovereignty, Foundations neglects the 
generation of power through pre-institutional acts of egalitarian solidarity 
(Brunkhorst) and the normative significance of public authority as the manifestation 
of subjective freedom in a political community of equals (Yeatman).  
 
Hauke Brunkhorst challenges Foundations’ basic prioritization of a top-to-bottom 
dynamic of state formation and political development. In its place Brunckhorst 
resurrects the idea of potentia as social or communicative power, which emerges from 
the ‘bottom-up’, in the manner suggested, for example, by Hannah Arendt or Jürgen 
Habermas. Foundations thus overlooks the possibilities of a rational (more than 
prudential) grounding of public law in the communicative power of the people, a 
process that precedes the formation of concrete order and reunites voluntas and ratio. 
This is advanced not only in order to hold open the possibility of emancipation, but to 
retrieve traditions of public law that Foundations also alludes to in its outline of 
political jurisprudence (from Spinoza to Arendt), but which ‘go missing’ as potentia 
emerges as merely technical regulatory power through the 20
th
 and into the 21
st
 
century (a loss explained by Foundations’ adoption of a meta-narrative of constituent 
power as state-sovereignty rather than egalitarian solidarity).  
 
Anna Yeatman too argues that to successfully revive the tradition of political right 
requires a retrieval not only of a practical and prudential discourse – as Foundations 
attempts – but also, as it rejects, an explicitly ethical discourse based on subjective 
freedom. The unification in the early modern imagination of state and subjective 
freedom (which through Spinoza and Hegel play a significant part in the construction 
of political jurisprudence) is lost along the way in Foundations, and once it recedes, 
the emergence of social law and dominance of a functionalist mindset threaten to 
resemble ‘the road to serfdom’.7 Rather than viewing the rise of the social as 
terminating the dialectic of potentia and potestas (and lamenting the ‘destruction of 
the modern edifice of public law’) we should instead view it through the lens of an 
evolution of subjective right in an increasingly complex world, a further stage in the 
dialectic of potentia and potestas. Only then might contemporary neo-liberal anti-
statism be properly contested, as it must be in order to conceive of the state as 
expressing a form of public freedom rather than merely patrimonial service. 
Foundations’ equivocation on and ultimate denial of any normative standpoint thus 
threatens to undermine its overall promise for the discipline of public law.  
 
 
The Materialist Critique 
 
There is a different challenge to Foundations that emerges in a significant sense from 
an opposing perspective to the normative critique and which we label here as 
‘materialist’. From this perspective, the problem with Foundations is that it presents 
conflicting claims over the common good in overly abstract terms, even naturalizing 
in a Hobbesian fashion the human condition of antagonism and formalizing the 
relationship between rulers and ruled. In other words, rather than being insufficiently 
normative, Foundations is insufficiently concrete, in a sense that is familiar to critical 
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theory and Marxist traditions. Rationalising the art of governing requires an account – 
missing from Foundations - of how concrete social conflict, real domination, and 
power dynamics are translated into and in turn shape the ordering and outcome of 
political negotiations and of the content of political right. Foundations, in other 
words, fails to account for the material phenomena that condition political claims, in 
particular the interplay of concrete subjectivities from below through class struggle. 
From a materialist perspective, this omission betrays a residue of formalism and even 
ideology, privileging – or at least reifying- one particular but contingent form of rule, 
neglecting that the state has not only a political but also a material constitution.   
 
Whilst complementing Foundations’ adoption of a dialectic of power and authority, 
Marco Goldoni thus suggests that its analytics is overly formal. Goldoni picks as an 
example its metaphor of public law as grammar, which elides the element of political 
agency at play in the generation of different grammars or even of an overarching ‘Ur-
grammar’. As a corrective, Goldoni proposes the integration into political 
jurisprudence of the political subjectivities whose actions are responsible for forging 
the content of the material constitution. Integrating these insights means more than 
merely emphasising the formal possibility of revolutionary interruption or ‘disruption’ 
of the status quo (a la Ranciere); it requires analyzing in greater detail the political-
economic organisation of society, including those hegemonic forces that shape it. By 
establishing the ‘conditions of visibility’ of political subjects the potential dividends 
of a focus on the material constitution can be fully cashed out, not by a crude 
reductionism of politics to causal economic forces but by an integration of economic 
and material features into an analysis of the evolving political constitution.   
 
 
The Methodological Critique 
 
There is third an ‘external’ critique of Foundations that questions its basic 
methodological approach and working assumptions. This casts doubt on the viability 
and desirability of a search for any singular, scientific account (however internally 
complex and differentiated) of an object that can be called ‘public law’ when the 
practices that come under this label constitute a diverse set of contingent and 
incommensurable experiences. Foundations, in this view, is ultimately an incoherent 
exercise in conceptualisation; moreover, to the extent it claims purity it is an 
ideological view of, an apology even, for the modern state’s particular ruling forms 
and governing apparatus.  
 
Andrew Halpin’s critique is a direct assault on the methodological underpinnings of 
Foundations. It questions both the possibility as well as the desirability of projecting a 
uniform concept of public law based on a master narrative of the modern state. Halpin 
thus challenges each of Foundations’ key claims: the autonomy of public law, the 
possibility of a science of political right, political jurisprudence as the prudential 
approximation of this science, and public law as a grammar of political jurisprudence. 
For Halpin, the characteristics of public law are determined by particular social and 
political circumstances; there is no uniform conception of a state (or of its institutional 
branches) that undergirds public law. The attempt to impose one elides the variety of 
questions that public law needs to answer and of problems it is and might be called on 
to resolve. Since there is no single problematic that gives the modern state its raison 
d’etre, public law loses any claim to autonomy. And even if there were such a 
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problematic, there is no reason to suppose it would be restricted to public as opposed 
to private law in his account. On the contrary, since there are multiple concepts of 
public law, stained by their own ideological hues, Foundations succeeds only in 
providing an account of one more, albeit dressed in a (spurious) garb of objectivity. 
This not only overlooks important local differences, skewing our understanding of 
public law as a particular phenomenon, but also is liable to elevate its own 
unwarranted trust in juristic forms to ‘negotiate’ social tensions at the expense of an 
authentic political hearing. 
  
The Comparativist Critique 
 
If the methodological critique suggested that Foundations’ dependence upon a 
singular and uniform paradigm of the modern state fails to account for the actual 
diversity of political and public law forms as they have emerged across time and 
space, this suggestion only invites further specification of what these different forms 
are, where they might be found and why they depart from the paradigm. It invites, in 
other words, a critique from the perspective of comparative constitutional and public 
law. This section calls into question any claim to universality, to public law reflecting 
a unitary ordering of political right based on the edifice of the modern European state, 
by presenting a specific case study, namely French and UK administrative law, based 
on court-centric practice and emerging sporadically and laterally. This suggests that 
whilst Foundations may have offered an account of the ‘foundations’ of a very 
particular ideal type of public law (although one that remains underspecified), it is far 
from having offered a persuasive account of the foundations of public law per se.  
 
Denis Baranger addresses two phenomena which should be central to or at least easily 
integrated into the vernacular of Foundations: British and French administrative law. 
Specifically he queries whether Foundations fully captures the emergence of the 
court-based jurisprudence which has generated administrative law in both contexts. 
This, after all, is the law commonly referred to by ‘public law’ in contemporary 
scholarship, including administrative action, regulation, and judicial review. In 
Baranger’s view, modern administrative law does not emerge out of a foundational 
process of ‘political jurisprudence’; it is rather a ‘lateral’ development, emerging in a 
‘sporadic and peripheral’ fashion. And yet it evolves into a feature that becomes 
central to the discipline of public law as a whole. In other words, the French and 
British fields of administrative law, despite their significant differences, have both 
developed outside any foundational narratives of ‘the State’ or of ‘the Constitution’, 
and they remain in that suspended state. This autonomy is best explained as a process 
of ‘differentiation’, the state distinguishing (or ‘derogating’) the exercise of its powers 
from private law ordering. But in that sense public law is derivative rather than 
foundational. 
 
* * * 
 
In conclusion, these critiques suggest that while Foundations represents a key and in 
significant respects novel approach to reconstructing public law, much work remains 
to be done.  They suggest that the attempt to grasp the foundations of public law (if 
such exist), is likely to require further and more complex theoretical and practical 
insights than are captured in Foundations itself.  This is less a criticism of 
Foundations, than an encouragement to continue the journey it begins. Foundations 
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provides a crucial first step, and will be germinal in fomenting a new wave of 
scholarship that considers questions so often removed from mainstream public law 
scholarship. The critical essays presented in this special issue identify some of what 
we can expect to encounter on the further stages of this journey.  
